The data-driven power of Google and co.
A risk to competition?  Bertelsmann Policy Brief #2018/04 by Stühmeier, Torben
 Page 1 
Future Social Market Economy 
Is data really the new oil? Some say that access to this basic commodity is decisive 
for the success and failure of entire business models in the digital markets. Would an 
obligation to share data with competitors be an adequate means 
of ensuring fair competition in these markets? 
 
 
Increasing market power among a relative few 
companies appears to be a growing trend in the 
United States and in OECD countries. In the 
United States, the phenomenon of highly produc-
tive and innovative firms that combine large por-
tions of the market under their own control – “su-
perstar” firms – is particularly evident. The so-
called FAANG companies (Facebook, Apple, 
Amazon, Netflix and Google) are key representa-
tives of this trend.  
Europe shows a rather less clear, and strongly 
heterogeneous, picture. No overall rise in market 
concentration can be identified either within the 
European Union as a whole (Valletti, 2017) or 
within Germany alone (Monopolkommission 
2018). However, as in the United States, there 
are signs of increasing market power. For exam-
ple, Weche and Wambach (2018) observe that 
the average level of markups has risen in many 
of the EU-28 member states since 2012. In Ger-
many and a few other member states such as 
Belgium and Finland, pre-crisis levels have al-
ready been exceeded. Particularly companies 
that held a significant degree of market power in 
the past have been able to expand their market 
power further. 
A broadly similar trend is evident with regard to 
productivity growth. Empirical studies within 
OECD countries show a decline in the growth of 
average labor productivity since the beginning of 
the 2000s in nearly all developed countries (An-
drews et al., 2016). Moreover, innovative produc-
tion technologies have increasingly been con-
centrated within a small group of large compa-
nies. Over the same time period, the productivity 
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gap between these and other companies has ex-
panded (Andrews et al., 2016; Adler et al., 2017). 
Only a few companies are becoming significantly 
more productive, while the rest are stagnating. In 
addition, productivity growth is no longer inclu-
sive; a broad cross-section of companies has be-
come delinked from productivity growth. 
This poses a number of urgent questions for eco-
nomic policy. The first is whether these two 
trends are connected. Is the increase in market 
power serving as a brake on productivity growth? 
The second – if such a relationship exists – is 
what economic-policy instruments are appropri-
ate for countering this trend. 
The first question is the subject of current empiri-
cal research and has not yet been conclusively 
answered (Blonigen and Pierce, 2016; De 
Loecker and Van Biesebroeck, 2016). However, 
there are indications elsewhere that increases in 
market power have far-reaching macroeconomic 
consequences. For example, recent studies on 
the United States show a negative relationship 
between market power and labor shares. The 
distribution of economic income has shifted in fa-
vor of companies since the 1980s, with the share 
of labor income accordingly reduced (Autor et al., 
2017). The Bertelsmann Stiftung recently con-
firmed a similar relationship within German ser-
vice industries (Ponattu et al., 2018).  
The increasing market concentration thus not 
only impairs market competition, but also has far-
reaching macroeconomic and sociopolitical con-
sequences. Indeed, it shifts the balance of power 
from workers and consumers to capital and leads 
to an unequal distribution of wealth. These devel-
opments are easily identified in digital markets. 
For example, the Bertelsmann Stiftung study 
shows that these trends are particularly pro-
nounced in industries where digital transfor-
mation is well underway. 
As a result, policymakers have paid increasing 
attention to digital markets. Some observers re-
gard the slow diffusion of digital technologies as 
one possible source of the sluggish productivity 
growth seen in a large number of companies. 
SMEs are finding it increasingly difficult to adopt 
innovative technologies, and entire regions are 
being left further behind (Andrews et al., 2015; 
Andrews et al., 2016). The latter development in 
particular bears potentially explosive sociopoliti-
cal consequences.  
Data as a basic commodity 
Competition policy is one of the numerous instru-
ments by which policymakers might seek to 
counteract slow and non-inclusive productivity 
growth. For example, in a guest column for the 
German-language business newspaper Han-
delsblatt on 13 August 2018, SPD leader Andrea 
Nahles called for a policy in which the large U.S. 
tech companies in particular would be required to 
make their data available to smaller competitors.  
“As soon as a digital company exceeded 
a predetermined market share for a cer-
tain time, it would be obligated to share 
an anonymized and representative por-
tion of its accumulated data.”  
Even some leading competition economists have 
warmed to this demand, recommending in an ad-
visory opinion on modernizing the German Fed-
eral Ministry for Economic Affairs’ market-abuse 
oversight function that a data-sharing obligation 
be considered (Schweitzer et al., 2018, p. 152). 
The European Commission (2018) also recog-
nizes the significant economic potential in data-
sharing and has set a goal of erecting a Euro-
pean data economy. The Commission wants to 
create the legal and technical conditions to facili-
tate data-sharing between companies, so as to 
enable them to train their artificial-intelligence ap-
plications. However, the current consultation pro-
cess has yet to consider a direct obligation to 
share. As it currently stands, the burden of devel-
oping a code of conduct for data-sharing rests on 
the shoulders of companies. Depending on the 
structure of the individual markets, however, 
“sector-specific measures” could be necessary in 
order to enable fair and open competition. The 
precise character of these measures has yet to 
be specified. Nonetheless, given that Competi-
tion Commissioner Margrethe Vestager 
has already intervened energetically in other digi-
tal-economy cases, particularly against Google 
(see below), a data-sharing obligation is quite 
conceivable.  
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We turn now to connecting the dots between the 
data-sharing obligation and the promotion of 
productivity growth. If data is the new oil, should 
it be shared among competitors? The demand to 
share oil would likely have astonished many in 
the analog era. We will thus seek to clarify this 
issue below.  
The fact is, data – like oil – is in numerous ways 
a critical input within the value chain. For exam-
ple, retailers use data on previous purchases to 
learn more about consumers’ preferences and 
can offer them more individualized offers in the 
future. Sensors send data on the use of products 
and, in so doing, can report on an automobile’s 
maintenance requirements directly to the auto 
shop, for instance. In an artificial-intelligence en-
vironment, programs learn continuously on the 
basis of experienced values, a capability that 
might someday enable the automobile to drive to 
the auto shop on its own. 
Data is thus an input for the further development 
of diverse processes and products. However, 
data as an input factor is different from oil in two 
fundamental respects, which is why many econo-
mists are not entirely pleased with the analogy. 
First, data is non-rival in consumption. The use 
of data by one company does not prevent the 
use of the same data by other companies. In 
other words, in principle, data can be shared. 
Second, data is heterogeneous. Different kinds 
of data are used for different purposes. Machine-
generated data relating to maintenance needs is 
of little value to online retailers. For this reason, 
there is no unified market for data as an input 
factor. Moreover, it is not the data alone that de-
termines the associated economic value. Algo-
rithms can identify patterns and develop inde-
pendent solutions to problems only by analyzing 
and combining datasets. For an algorithm to 
learn and improve itself, it needs access to a 
massive amount of data – what is now called big 
data. 
Share data – promote 
competition? 
Observers point to a possible competitive prob-
lem in the fact that large corpuses of data are 
typically available only to large companies. Many 
experts today debate whether a kind of “data 
power” exists in addition to economic market 
power (see Körber, 2017). This could lead to a 
significant barrier to effective competition if com-
petitors lacked access to that data. Without ac-
cess to the important basic commodity needed to 
improve their own products and processes, they 
would in turn fall farther behind with regard to in-
ternet-of-things (IoT) technologies, for example.  
The proposed data-sharing obligation is in its es-
sence derived from this idea. However, the spe-
cific channels through which data power is likely 
to reinforce market power remain unclear. Large 
companies can potentially profit from two effects: 
economies of scale and economies of scope.  
Big data’s competitive advantages 
Big companies generate large amounts of data 
on their own. If their sheer size creates a com-
petitive advantage for them, they benefit from so-
called economies of scale. This is the case here 
if a larger amount of data implies a greater bene-
fit. In such a situation, an algorithm improves as 
it is fed more data. This is particularly the case in 
the realm of deep learning, a sub-field of artificial 
intelligence in which the algorithm learns con-
stantly as it continuously evaluates and creates 
new links within streams of data. For example, 
Amazon’s Alexa virtual assistant becomes faster, 
and offers better answers, as more people use 
its services. The competitive advantage in-
creases with the quantity of data.  
In addition to the evaluation of larger amounts of 
data, large companies also benefit from so-called 
economies of scope. The leading technology 
companies are typically active in a number of 
markets. For example, Google operates the most 
successful search engine, but also produces An-
droid, the most successful mobile-phone operat-
ing system; the Google Maps mapping service; 
and the YouTube video-streaming service. Al-
phabet, Google’s parent company, is also active 
in many additional markets, such as those for ar-
tificial intelligence and the development of self-
driving automobiles. This allows data obtained 
from a multiplicity of sources to be used for many 
services simultaneously. This also means that 
data can be linked and combined so as to drive 
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further developments in the artificial-intelligence 
sphere, for example.  
However, the economic principle of marginal rev-
enue equating with marginal costs should also 
apply here. The company will analyze additional 
data, and thus benefit from the economies of 
scale and scope, only so long as the income 
from the additional data analysis is greater than 
the additional costs of the data processing. De-
ciding when this condition holds can probably be 
done only on a case-to-case basis. However, the 
more critical question is this: Is access to the 
technology leader’s data so crucial that competi-
tion is altogether impossible without access to 
this data?  
Is data power market power? 
In the ninth amendment to the Act Against Re-
straints of Competition (GWB), the German par-
liament expressly observed that market power 
can be derived from the control over data. 
The newly introduced legislation under Sec. 18 
para. 3a says that assessments of the market 
positions of particularly diversified platforms and 
networks must also take “access to competition-
relevant data” into account.  
In principle, the call to share what is potentially 
the most crucial element of market power – in 
this case, data – is not entirely new. As many 
network industries were liberalized in the 1990s, 
so-called monopolistic bottlenecks – the net-
works themselves - persisted. For example, new 
competitors in the energy, railway and telecom-
munications markets could not offer competitive 
products or services without access to the net-
work facilities of the formerly state-owned com-
panies. For this reason, infrastructure operators 
were obligated by law to provide competitors with 
reasonable, non-discriminatory and transparent 
access to their essential facilities, in this case the 
networks.  
A similar call is now being made for data. How-
ever, applying the principle of access to an es-
sential facility is associated with strict criteria, as 
it falls into the contentious area between access 
rights and property rights. The facility must meet 
two standards:  
First, a facility is essential if its duplication by po-
tential competitors is economically or technically 
unfeasible. Second, access to the facility must 
be essential to competition in a downstream or 
after-market – typically the consumer market. It 
remains unclear what kind of data would fulfill 
both these criteria simultaneously. However, it 
appears that the universe of such datasets is ra-
ther small, because a great deal of data is not 
exclusive, and can be obtained from the market. 
This applies especially to personal data, which 
can originate from a variety of sources as well as 
being generated by the technology companies. 
For example, location data can be obtained 
through various app providers, the mobile net-
work service provider, or other third parties.  
By contrast, IoT technologies typically require 
non-personal data, such as machine-generated 
and product-usage data. This is often obtainable 
exclusively from the producer, so the criteria of 
exclusivity are rather more easily satisfied. How-
ever, the extent to which this is so indispensable 
that no competition is possible without access to 
this data can probably be determined only on a 
case-by-case basis. As Schweitzer et al. (2018) 
also note, case law certainly recognizes such 
cases in the after-markets. For example, auto 
producers are obligated to provide independent 
automobile workshops with access to diagnostic 
and information systems, because competition 
would otherwise be impossible in the down-
stream market. In principle, it is thus conceivable 
that some data is so exclusive, and not otherwise 
available on the market, that it could be regarded 
as essential.  
In the context of the after-market, market foreclo-
sure may thus result at the downstream level. In 
the context of monitoring the undue restraint of 
market power, exclusionary abuse refers to com-
panies with a paramount market position in rela-
tion to its competitors. Of course, this can also 
take place in digital markets. In April 2015, for 
example, the European Commission opened a 
proceeding against Google, alleging abuse of a 
dominant market position in the mobile-phone 
operating system market. One of the allegations 
was that Google had tied its Chrome browser to 
its dominant Android system, and thus unfairly 
obstructed competition in the market for mobile 
web browsers. Due to this behavior, among other 
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factors, a record-breaking fine of €4.34 billion 
was imposed on Google in August 2018. 
Fundamentally, competition law thus has instru-
ments with which to sanction the abuse of mar-
ket power in digital markets. However, these in-
struments only intervene when the abuse has 
taken place, and competitors have already been 
damaged. At this point, it may already be too 
late. In the course of the procedure’s approxi-
mately 3.5-year duration, the market share held 
by Google’s Chrome increased from 52% to 
68%. Google was able to solidify its dominant 
position further, and perhaps for good. For the 
time being, the penalty payment does nothing to 
change this situation. 
This is a general problem in many digital mar-
kets. In many of these markets, so-called net-
work effects play an important role. Users mi-
grate to platforms that already have many other 
users. This can have the effect of tipping the 
market toward a particular provider (so-called 
winner-takes-all markets). In such a case, it is vi-
tal to attract many users at an early stage. In 
terms of competition policy, this seems unprob-
lematic – at first glance. 
However, competition within the market must be 
fair and open. Particularly in the case of network 
and platform markets, an intervention must be 
made significantly earlier and more swiftly if an 
abuse of market power is identified – and cer-
tainly before the market threatens to tilt irretrieva-
bly. In such a situation, compulsory data sharing 
is a valid instrument for the preservation of other 
competitors’ market opportunities.  
However, this prophylactic instrument can be 
only one among several instruments employed. 
The data-sharing obligation alone is not enough; 
the potential for discrimination against competi-
tors continues to exist. In such a case, competi-
tion policy must be able to intervene more 
quickly and more effectively, before the game is 
already decided. In order to keep up with the dy-
namics of digital markets, the agency tasked with 
monitoring abusive practices requires more ca-
pacity, staff and regulatory clout. 
Share data – undermine 
competition? 
In principle, data sharing could have some nega-
tive effects on competition. For example, the risk 
of algorithmic collusion is currently being dis-
cussed in the context of digital markets. The 
heart of this discussion focuses on whether self-
learning algorithms can align their price-setting 
practices in such a way as to achieve a so-called 
collusive equilibrium. In this case, one can also 
speak of a collective market power. All compa-
nies in the market can overall achieve higher 
prices and profit levels than would be possible 
under competitive conditions. The coordination 
on this equilibrium could be facilitated through 
the use of the same data. The consequences of 
collective market power are analogous to the ef-
fects described above: Resources are no longer 
deployed efficiently, and productivity suffers. 
Driven by such concerns, the German Bun-
deskartellamt and the French Autorité de la con-
currence (the countries’ respective competition-
protection agencies) have initiated a joint project 
intended to analyze challenges to competition 
policy that arise from the increased use of algo-
rithms. Similar discussions are taking place at 
the OECD, among other venues. 
More broadly, it has long been recognized that 
the exchange of data can have both efficiency-in-
creasing and collusion-promoting effects. If the 
markets are already very concentrated, and if in-
dividual data on costs and demand are shared, 
the risk of collusion is assumed to be higher than 
would be the case in competitive markets in 
which only aggregated data is shared (see Kühn 
and Vives, 1995).  
However, even if a debate regarding the risks of 
algorithmic collusion remains in full swing, risks 
of this kind associated with the current discus-
sion on compulsory data sharing appear to be 
negligible. In such cases, the markets are gener-
ally very concentrated, and characterized by a 
few dominant providers. For this reason, the pri-
mary concern is to enable newcomers and 
startup companies to compete. Moreover, the 
proposals focus on the exchange of anonymized 
and machine-generated data for the purposes of 
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algorithm training, so issues of pricing are not di-
rectly involved. 
In addition to raising controversial property-rights 
issues, the data-sharing obligation touches on 
contentious data-privacy concerns. With regard 
to personal data, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) contains specific regulations 
mandating that the persons to which the data re-
lates must provide consent to third parties’ ac-
cess to this data, as well as to the way it is used. 
This standard can be met if no more than anony-
mized data is shared, allowing no inferences to 
be drawn about specific people. For an algo-
rithm, it is generally unimportant whether the 
data comes from a specific person or is simply 
representative of a group of people.  
As noted above, primarily non-personal data 
such as machine-generated and product-usage 
data is what matters most with regard to produc-
tivity growth. Thus, fewer conflicts with data-pri-
vacy provisions can expected, even if there may 
be sensitive cases here as well. 
Summary 
Overall, there are reasons to create a legally an-
chored obligation to share exclusive data 
deemed essential to the preservation of competi-
tion. An obligation of this nature provides com-
petitors to the superstar firms opportunities to 
train their own algorithms and thus preserve their 
competitive prospects. The institution of property 
rights, as a cornerstone of market economies, 
should be interfered with only when driven by a 
strong public interest. In the case of data-sharing 
for fair competition, the public interest is clear. 
In the absence of such measures, we face a risk 
that market entities competing to develop future 
technologies will fall further behind the currently 
dominant companies. This would have far-reach-
ing macroeconomic and sociopolitical conse-
quences. On the one hand, decreased competi-
tion reduces the pressure on established compa-
nies to continue bringing new and innovative 
products and services to market. On the other, 
the balance of power is already increasingly 
shifting from labor to capital, which involves an 
increasingly unequal distribution of macrosocial 
well-being.  
However, the obligation to share data can be 
only one among a number of instruments de-
ployed. Moreover, it requires strong and effective 
oversight of potentially abusive market practices. 
Entities performing this function must be able to 
keep pace with the dynamics of digital markets, 
which perpetually present competition policy with 
new challenges. Some of the challenges are al-
ready familiar from traditional markets. However, 
many, such as the evaluation of data, are not. 
Competition authorities need additional capaci-
ties and instruments in order to meet these new 
challenges. Above all, they must have the regu-
latory clout to intervene at a significantly earlier 
point – that is, before the markets have been ir-
reversibly tipped in favor of a few superstar firms. 
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